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Indemnity bond for mortgage cancellation
It is the duty of the recorder of mortgages to cancel a mortgage upon proof of the payment or extinction of the principal
indebtedness for which the mortgage was security." He is responsible for the improper cancellation of a mortgage without
adequate evidence. In State ex rel. Hope v. Hickey,7 the recorder
of mortgages of Orleans Parish was requested to cancel a mortgage without the production of the cancelled mortgage note
which, it was alleged, had been lost or destroyed. His refusal to
do so without the posting of an indemnity bond was not supported by the trial court but on appeal his position was sustained
by the Supreme Court. The recorder performs a very important
and responsible function, and it would facilitate the possibility
for abuse to compel him to cancel a mortgage without adequate
evidence or security.
If a written instrument has been lost or destroyed, there is
a legal procedure to reestablish it with a judgment which then
has the same force and effect as the original instrument.8 But if
the evidence tends to show that there never was a mortgage note
(as in present case), there seems to be no other way to have
the mortgage cancelled than by posting an indemnity bondunless the recorder is willing to make the erasure on his own
personal responsibility.
SALE

Alvin B. Rubin*
Formalities
In Lemoine v. Lacour,' plaintiff sued for specific performance
of an alleged contract to sell immovable property. The only
written evidence was a receipt which read "Received from Mr.
Clifton Lemoine $35.00 for payment on place." The court held
that the petition stated no cause of action because it attempted
to enforce a verbal sale of immovable property in contravention
of the provisions of Civil Code Article 2440. However, the court
allowed plaintiff to supplement his pleadings and to interrogate
6. Art. 3371, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. 36 So.(2d) 5 (La. 1948).
8. La. Act 57 of 1886, §H 3-12 (Section 3 as amended by La. Act 30 of 1900,

§ 1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7862-7861].
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1. 213 La. 109, 34 So. (2d) 392 (1948).
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defendant on oath regarding the verbal sale, pursuant to the provisions of Article 2275. The court distinguished other cases in
which a receipt was relied upon to support a contract to sell immovable property 2 on the ground that "In each of them the
writing relied upon contained a substantial description of the
affected property." The distinction drawn appears entirely
sound.
Earnest Money
In Johnson v. Johnson,4 plaintiff had contracted to sell a
house and lot to defendant. For reasons discussed in the section
of this article dealing with community property, defendant refused to accept title, and the court affirmed the correctness of
defendant's position. A year after institution of a suit by plaintiff for specific performance, and a reconventional demand by
defendant, plaintiff remedied the title defect, but the court refused to require defendant to accept title at that belated time.5
The contract between plaintiff and defendant contained the
provision that "In the event that the seller does not comply with
this agreement to sell within the time specified, the purchaser
shall have the right, either to demand the return of double the
deposit, or specific performance." The court held that this clause
did not justify an award of double the deposit under the facts
of the case because, "Sellers are attempting to enforce specific
performance of the contract. It cannot be said that they have
arbitrarily refused to convey title, when in truth, they are, even
now, willing to comply with the contract ....
Right of View and Trial
Generally speaking, in Louisiana risk of loss follows title.
Article 2460 of the Civil Code provides that where the buyer
reserves "the view and trial of" the thing sold, this is a suspensive condition of the sale. This therefore defers passage of title,
and therefore passage of the risk of loss.
In American Creosote Works v. Boland Machine & Manufacturing Company 7 the supreme court found that the provisions of
a contract to sell creosoted fir pilings reserved to the buyer a
"right to check and inspect" and therefore held that "delivery
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Note (1947) 21 Tulane L. Rev. 706.
34 So. (2d) 392, 393 (La. 1948).
36 So. (2d) 396 (La. 1948).
See St. Landry Oil & Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928).
36 So. (2d) 396, 400 (La. 1948).
213 La. 834, 35 So. (2d) 749 (1948).
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was never completed under the terms of the contract." Or, to put
the matter in other words, title did not pass prior to the exercise
of the right of view and trial. Therefore a loss of the fir pilings
by fire after they had been loaded on the buyer's barge, but before they had been inspected by him, fell upon the seller since
title had not yet passed.
Redhibitory Defects
In Savoie v. Snell,8 the court held a cracked engine block to
be a redhibitory defect in a second-hand automobile and rescinded
the sale. However, since the seller was in good faith, consequential damages were not awarded. The buyer had been granted in
addition damages by the court of appeal under the provisions of
the Emergency Price Control Act 9 for an overcharge, since the
ceiling price for an automobile not in good running order was
less than the price actually charged-the ceiling price for an automobile in good condition. The supreme court amended the decision to reject this award, since rescission placed both parties in
the status quo ante, and no additional relief appeared due under
the code articles relating to redhibitory defects.
Validity of Title
Mr. and Mrs. Atkins created a charitable trust, and conveyed
immovable property to it, but failed to give the trustee authority to sell the real estate. Thereafter, the trustee and Mr. and
Mrs. Atkins contracted to sell the immovable property to Johnson, who refused tender of a deed signed by the trustee and by
Mr. and Mrs. Atkins in, which Mr. and Mrs. Atkins warranted
title. Thereupon Mr. and Mrs. Atkins instituted suit for specific
performance. The supreme court, in Atkins v. Johnston,0 reversed
the lower court and granted specific performance of the contract.
The court said,. "Obviously there is no merit to the contention
that the Trustee has no authority to sell the real estate. John B.
Atkins and his wife, who alone established the John B. Atkins
Foundation, are parties to the deed tendered to the defendants;
and, if the trust instrument failed to authorize the Trustee to
make the sale, authority is impliedly given by and through their
concurrence in transferring the property."
The court further held that no action in reduction or revendication would lie under Article 1517 by the forced heirs of Mr.
8. 213 La. 823, 35 So. (2d) 745 (1948).
9. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §901 et seq. (1942).
10. 213 La. 458, 35 So. (2d) 16 (1948).
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and Mrs. Atkins. This ruling was the subject of a dissent by
Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice McCaleb. This aspect of the
case is discussed elsewhere in this Review."
Time for Performance
In Davis v. Oaklawn,12 plaintiff was lessee of real estate.
Defendant corporation was the lessor-owner. Plaintiff paid an
additional consideration for an option to purchase, which was
incorporated into the lease. On the last day for the exercise
of his option, plaintiff gave written notice to defendant's president, who acknowledged in writing the exercise of the option.
The acknowledgment stipulated that the act of sale was to be
passed before December 21, 1945.
Since plaintiff required a loan to enable him to consummate
the transaction, he negotiated with a lending agency suggested
by defendant's agent, Jesse Jones. However, the loan was not
approved by December 21, 1945. On that date, plaintiff's attorney
(who, however, was not acting as attorney in the closing of the
loan) telephoned defendant's agent, Jesse Jones, who informed
him that the act of sale could not be passed that day. Plaintiff's
attorney asked for an extension of time, "and Jones suggested
... waiting until after the beginning of the year [1946] .. .and
that no written extension or agreement was necessary."'13 The
plaintiff in a companion case' 4 later met Jesse Jones in a grocery store and Jones there thanked him for waiting until after
January 1 to pass the acts of sale.
A check for the amount of the loan having been received
from the lending agency, all parties were notified by the secretary of the attorney who was handling the loan to be at his office
on January 8, 1946, to execute the act of sale. On this date, all
the documents were prepared, and checks were available to pay
the purchase price, but no representative of defendant appeared.
Meanwhile, defendant had mailed notices to plaintiff that it did
not intend to consummate the transaction "because the time
granted for passing the acts of sale had elapsed." 15
The court decided that plaintiff was entitled to specific performance because he had been "lulled into inactivity. . . . Certainly this defendant, whose agent had agreed to the delay and
11. See p. 182, supra, and p. 294 et seq., infra.
12. 212 La. 392, 31 So. (2d) 837 (1947).
13. 212 La. 392, 398, 31 So. (2d) 837, 839.
14. Peacock v. Oaklawn, 212 La. 392, 31 So. (2d) 837 (1947), consolidated
with the Davis case for trial.
15. 212 La. 392, 399, 31 So. (2d) 837, 839.
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had suggested that the acts of sale be passed after January 1,
cannot now take the position that, because of such delay, these
plaintiffs have lost their rights under the contracts to purchase." 16
The court apparently assumed, at least arguendo, that defendant had the authority to qualify its acknowledgment of
plaintiff's exercise of the option by stating a date for passage of
the act of sale. This proposition would appear to be debatable.
But finding an estoppel against the defendant resolved the matter in plaintiff's favor.
The notice of exercise of the option created a contract to buy
and sell as between plaintiff and defendant. Assuming that the
time for execution of the option was a valid term of this contract, two questions concerning the estoppel approach suggest
themselves. First, would an extension of time, gratuitously given,
bind defendants? Under the facts found by the court, the extension was given as much for defendant's convenience as for plaintiff's and there was therefore a mutual consideration for it.
The second question is whether estoppel will suffice to eliminate the requirement of a written instrument as to the time for
performance. The supreme court has previously assumed that
an estoppel would be sufficient to extend the time specified for
performance of a contract to sell.17 This approach would appear
to be equitable, although somewhat difficult to reconcile logically
with Article 2276.
The plaintiff in Peacock v. Oaklawn, the companion case, had
asked for specific performance, and, in addition, for damages
resulting from loss of profits on a projected resale of the property
to a third person. The court dismissed this demand as of nonsuit because there was not sufficient evidence in the record to
determine the exact profit which plaintiff would have made.
Justice McCaleb dissented from this portion of the decision.
Quoting Articles 1926 and 1927 of the Civil Code, he urged that an
injured party has an election to sue either for resultant damages
or for specific performance, but not for both. Justice McCaleb
pointed out quite cogently that "the recognition by the majority
of a right in Peacock to recover his alleged lost profit in addition
to a specific performance places him in a better position than
he would have been if the defendant had complied with his
agreement."' 8
16. 212 La. 392, 400, 31 So. (2d) 837, 840.

17. See Lamar v. Young, 211 La. 837, 30 So. (2d) 853 (1947). See also

Bonfleld v. Tichenor, 189 So. 635 (La. App. [Or].] 1939).
18. 212 La. 392, 405, 31 So. (2d) 837, 841 (1947).
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The case of Johnson v. Shreveport Properties,Incorporated,9
presented a somewhat similar problem with regard to a failure
to consummate a sale of real estate within the specified time.
The court again did not consider the question whether a written
extension of time was necessary, saying, "If time were of the
essence df the contract under consideration the argument thus
made might be effective. But the pleadings ... together with the
annexed documents, do not show this to be true. In fact, incidentally, on the trial of the case it was clearly and definitely
disclosed that the fifteen day period stipulated for consummation
of the sale was of no importance and further that it had been
' 20
waived by the parties.
That case further involved a problem of offer and acceptance discussed in the obligations section of this article. The
court concluded that an offer, made in writing, had been accepted.
The plaintiff, who was the prospective vendee, had deposited
$5,000.00 earnest money and the court awarded plaintiff double
this amount for non-performance of the contract by the vendor,
under the provisions of Civil Code Article 2463.
In the companion case of Stoer v. Shreveport Properties,
Incorporated,21 the court held that since the real estate agent
who handled the transaction had succeeded in completing a valid
contract to sell the property, he was entitled to be paid his commission.
After-Acquired Title
In the case of Watermen v. Tidewater Associated Oil Company 22 the court held that the doctrine of after-acquired title
does not apply to a sale by quitclaim deed. The after-acquired
title rule, briefly stated, is that where a vendor sells property
which he does not own and thereafter acquires title, his "afteracquired" title vests immediately in his vendee.23 The court
said that the doctrine is based on the theory of warranty and "is
really nothing more than an enforcement of the grantor's obligation to deliver a good title. And it may even be proper to extend
application of the doctrine to a sale without warranty where
19. 213 La. 485, 35 So. (2d) 25 (1948).
20. 35 So. (2d) 25, 26.
21. 213 La. 503, 35 So. (2d) 31 (1948).
22. 213 La. 588, 35 So. (2d) 225 (1948).
23. See Guice v. Mason, 156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924); St. Landry Oil
and Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24 (1928).
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the land conveyed is adequately described. In such a case, it
might be argued that the vendor would be precluded from subsequently acquiring... title to the prejudice of the vendee under
Article 2504 of the Civil Code ....On the other hand, it is quite
manifest that the doctrine of after-acquired title should not be
expanded to include a quitclaim deed, primarily for the reason
that a conveyance of that character transfers only the present
interest of the vendor in the land and does not convey the property. ' 24 (Italics supplied.)
In a brief dissent, Justice Hamiter stated his opinion that
the doctrine of after-acquired title should have been applied.
The problem presented to the court was one of no little
logical difficulty and the solution reached is probably a tenable
one, pursuant to the logic already stated. However, it can be
forcibly argued that the civil law concept of the obligations of
the vendor, and the scope of his warranty, should be more embracive. Article 2504 of our Civil Code provides that the warranty of the vendor against his personal acts cannot be waived:
"Any contrary agreement is void." The result reached in Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Company means that this provision can be largely circumvented by the simple expedient of
phrasing a conveyance as a quitclaim.
The reasoning of the majority is perhaps exemplified by one
expression made in reference to an earlier decision: "We are
unable to discern why Rapp should have been barred from buying the property merely because he had previously sold it to
Towny in 1870. '' 25 (Italics supplied.) Article 2504 viewed in the
light of the obligations of the seller under our code would seem
to imply that "merely because he had previously sold" the same
property might be sufficient reason to bar a vendor from later
acquiring a title superior to his vendee's whether the original
sale had been by quitclaim or by warranty act.
Several other problems involved in the Waterman case were
disposed of by reference to the particular facts involved. The
court held that a statute conveying title from the state to a levee
district did not convey the lands in question; that plaintiff could
not claim an "equitable title in the land; that an attacked tax
sale had been valid; and that there was no title based on 10 year
acquisitive prescription."
24. 35 So. (2d) 225, 233 (La. 1948).
25. 35 So. (2d) 225, 234.

